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Abstract: This paper studies the relative performances of contractual
arrangements used in the French local public transport industry. Levels of
inefficiency are estimated with a production frontier approach. The results
confirm the theoretical properties of incentive contracts that lead to better
technical efficiency.
1.  INTRODUCTION
In each French city, a local authority regulates the public transport industry.
Most of these “Organising Authorities” do not choose a direct administration
(régie), and the coexistence of several operators in the same area is
uncommon. Usually, a single operator provides the urban transport service. In
that case, a formal contract between the authority and an operating company
defines the service specifications and the financing rules (pricing and
subsidies). This paper aims to explore the different types of contract and their
impact on the efficiency of public transit systems. Attention will be focused on
the operational side (as opposed to the commercial side) and especially on
the operators’ level of efficiency. Our objective is to investigate the incentive
clauses that may influence technical efficiency.
In order to obtain an econometric measure of inefficiency levels, we use a
production frontier approach. The idea of best-practice frontier is to compare
efficiency over time, across space, or both. Among the methods, which have
been developed, we choose a parametric and stochastic specification. We run
a database that gathers the large results of an annual survey. A production
frontier is estimated for an eight-year panel of 136 French bus networks (989
observations) using the methodology proposed by Battese and Coelli [1995]. 
A recent survey (Murillo-Zamorano 2004) of the literature on frontier methods
highlights the raid growth of this field. Due to the development of frontier
methods for the study of efficiency, there is a large literature on the efficiency
of bus (De Borger, Kerstens and Costa 2002) or rail (Oum, Waters and Yu
1999) transportation. Urban transit systems have specificities from one
country to another. A lot of recent papers study the operators’ production
conditions, for instance in the U.S. (Sakano, Obeng and Azam 1997), Spain
(Matas and Raymond 1998), Japan (Mizutani and Urakami 2003), or Norway
(Jorgensen and Preston 2003).
But, this communication complements that kind of estimation by testing some
of the institutional determinants summarised in De Borger and Kerstens-2-
[2000]. Two recent contributions are close from our field (Gagnepain and
Ivaldi 2002) or our methodology (Dalen and Gomez-Lobo 2003). Gagnepain
and Ivaldi [2002] applied a structural approach
1 to the French sector. We did
not choose this methodology, which introduce unnecessary biases that are
avoided by the reduced form approach adopted here. Ivaldi and Gagnepain
concluded that cost-plus contract are dominated by any type of second-best
contract. On the other hand, Dalen and Gomez-Lobo [2003] used the
methodology we will use, proposed by Battese and Coelli [1995], to
investigate to what extend the different Norwegian regulatory contracts affect
bus companies efficiency. They confirmed the dynamic benefits of yardstick
competition.
The crucial question is which urban transit regulatory policy is best suited to
stimulate technical efficiency. By testing the theory of incentives, we would
like to participate in this debate. Our first contribution lie in the methodology
implemented in order to determine the contractual determinants of efficiency.
The second contribution concerns the database: this study is the first
econometric use of the current best French panel on urban transportation. 
The structure of this communication is therefore as follows: In section 2, we
comment on the regulatory chances in France. Section 3 describes our data.
In section 4, we present and discuss our model. Section 5 discusses our
empirical findings. Finally, in section 6, the main conclusions from our work
will be summarised. 
2.  REGULATORY SPECIFICITIES OF FRENCH URBAN TRANSPORT
The Domestic Transport Orientation Law (LOTI 1982) sets out the framework
in which public urban passenger transport networks can be operated. The
regulatory schemes have to take into account the fact that budgets are never
balanced without subsidies. Indeed, operating costs are twice as high as
commercial revenues in average. Prices are maintained at a low level in order
to ensure affordable access to all consumers. As a consequence, the local
communities, represented legally by an Organising Authority (OA), manage
the market well before the consumers.
Each OA has the responsibility to choose a regulatory policy in order to
organise the bus services in its area of responsibility. Direct operation by an
administration is rare. Moreover, when operation is delegated by contract, the
OA must issue a tendering procedure in order to choose the operator. Then a
contract determines the relationships between the OA and its partner. 
The contractual arrangements are multiple and various, but one of the most
important dimensions concerns the industrial risk distribution. A usual typology
defines the sharing of responsibilities and risks between the two partners
(Certu 2003). On the one hand, the Organising Authority takes on both the
commercial - the revenue - and industrial - the costs - risks in a “management
contract” (Gérance). On the other hand, the operator takes on the industrial-3-
risk and the commercial risk in a “net cost contract”. The OA provides an
additional contribution to compensate the fare restrictions and the obligations
related to the framework. In a “gross cost contract” (Gestion à Prix Forfaitaire),
the operator takes on the industrial risk alone. The OA pays its operator a
fixed annual sum determined as a function of forecast operating cost. This
typology is modelled in table 1, according to Caillaud and Quinet [1993].
Table 1: Risks and types of contract









− − − + =
=π π
Gross Cost Contract :
    ()












Net Cost Contract :






c c r r
=
− − − + =π π
   π  is the operator profit, s is the amount of subsidies, r correspond to the receipts and c represent
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In fact the contractual clauses are more various than suggested by the
previous model. The risk distribution often depends on the negotiations and
the local conditions. The share-out is rarely binary, and instead resembles a
compromise. Moreover, the contracts do not systematically correspond to
their name (from the usual typology). For instance, a net cost contract could
have become a management contract since the last tendering, but its name
remains the same. The contract is also a political signal. Aware of this
complexity, we will consider that contracts have statistically the same meaning
that suggested by their type name. This choice is more problematic for the
most general and the most used contract: the net cost contract.
3.  DATA
The database used here is provided by the CERTU (ministerial agency). The
CERTU collects the results of an annual survey to all the French networks
except in Paris area. The data are available between 1995 and 2002. We
excluded the networks with at least one mass transit system (subway and
tramway) which have obviously a different production function. We also
reduced our sample by excluding the small network (under 30,000
inhabitants) that we assume to also have a different production function. In
addition, several observations (network-year) are not full. Hence, an
unbalanced panel (99 observation are not in the panel) has been run. This
study is based on 989 yearly observations from 136 networks between 1995
and 2002.-4-
3.1.  Output and inputs
First consider the explicated variable, we opt for the number of vehicle-
kilometres. In the literature, a  “pure” supply indicator of output (e.g. vehicle-
km or seat km) or demand-related output measures (e.g. passenger-km or the
number of passengers) has been used. The main argument explaining our
choice is that inputs do not necessarily vary systematically with demand-
related measures, and therefore do not allow a reliable description of the
underlying technology.
We used the traditional inputs in transport described in table 2: capital
(number of vehicles), labour (including temporary work and subcontracting
personnel), and energy (equivalent diesel m
3). The decomposition between
driving and non-driving labour does not introduce additional elements and
weigh down unnecessarily the model estimated.
Two types of issues complicate the network comparison. First, urban areas
are characterised by different exogenous contexts: city sizes, types of
housing, natural barriers. Several endogenous choices should also not be
ignored: extensions into the suburbs, demand level (since we just consider the
operation side) and public obligations. These two types of variables need to
be controlled statistically. The estimation of a production function has a better
meaning if we take the network differences into account. However, controlling
for network structures and spatial characteristics is always a problem. 
We used two control variables: the networks’ length and the total amount of
journey.  The number of journey is important if we want to concentrate on the
production side. Moreover, the demand impact on efficiency needs to be
controlled. The networks’ length is also an important control variable because
an operator will be more productive in terms of vehicle-km if the network
stretches far away. For instance a bus is able to go faster outside of the city
than inside. We know that network length is a weak approximation of the
speed differences but it is the only variable available.  
Table 2: descriptive statistics
Mean Median Standard
deviation Min Max
Vehicle-km 2 468 941 1 266 089 2 535 040 178 106 11 380 524
Driving labour 108 56 120 7 691
Non-driving labour 38 18 46 1 280
Energy 1 113 533 1 257 63 6 006
Vehicle 64 37 64 5 365
Network length 158 110 127 14 645
Journey 6 901 3 266 8 395 173 38 295
Subcontracting 10,0% 4,6% 13,0% 0,0% 68,4%-5-
3.2.  The institutional determinants tested
We kept nine institutional variables that may influence efficiency. They deal
with direct administration, contractual type, company partner, call for tenders
and subcontracting.
Direct administration is not very common, especially in the larger networks.
The percentage of direct administration is less than 6% of the networks and
fewer than 3% of the vehicle-km provided (table 3). This scheme appears
difficult to implement in the cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.
However, Troyes and La Rochelle are the only example
2.
Two thirds of the regulatory schemes and 75% of the contracts are made up
of incentive clauses. The net cost contract represents 45% of the contract on
average and has an increased position during the period studied (figure 1).
The other ones have a share close to 25% on average. Gross cost contract is
the only one proportionally less used in the small networks.
The three major companies of the French urban transport sector, Connex,
Keolis and Transdev, represent up to 70% of the vehicle-km offered. They are
more involved in the big networks. Keolis has the biggest market share at
31% of the networks and 35% of the vehicle-km. This company is as big as








1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Net cost contract Gross cost contract Management contract Direct administration
Figure 1: Regulatory schemes from 1995 to 2002 (% of networks)-6-












31.0% 17.4% 14.4% 62.7% 41.4% 25.6% 23.4% 5.6% % of
networks 49.4% 27.8% 23.0 45.8% 28.3% 25.9%
35.2% 18.2% 16.1% 69.5% 46.0% 21.8% 29.4% 2.8% % of
vehicle-km 50.6% 26.2% 23.2% 47.3% 22.4% 30.2%
The second lines of small figures represent the percentages among the three major companies or
between the contracts only.
Table 4 displays the contingencies between the companies and the regulation
schemes. There are several key points. The first one is obvious since it
concerns the incompatibility between a direct administration and a private
company. The second situation concerns management contracts: Transdev
do not really use this type of contract (0.6% of the observations), even though
the networks without affiliation are using the management contracts more than
the others (11.6%). In the opposite, net cost contracts are particularly used by
Keolis (16%). This case is at least twice as common as the others. Finally,
Connex do not often use gross cost contracts (3.8%).
Table 4: Number of each type of contracts for each affiliation
Net Cost Gross Cost Management Direct Adm. Observations
KEOLIS 51.4% 27.1% 21.5% 0 317
CONNEX 49.7% 21.2% 29.1% 0 179










Observations 426 264 241 58 989
The variable Subcontracting, which represents the percentage of vehicle-km
subcontracted, is described in the last line of table 2. And the last variable we
tested was about one year before the end of the next call for tender. We
suspected modifications of behaviour had lead to an increase in efficiency on
the previous year.
4.  THE MODEL
Farrell [1957] introduced the idea of best-practice frontiers and provided the
first measurement scheme for efficiency. Several typologies of efficiency
concepts had been introduced since this seminal paper. We will focus on
technical efficiency, which appears to be the major source of poor-7-
performance in this sector (Kerstens 1999). Technical efficiency (TE) is
defined as production on the boundary of the production possibility set. An
operator is technically inefficient if its production occurs in the interior of the
possibility set. By including a TE parameter, the production function becomes:
TE X f Y ). , ( β =
where Y is the output, X the vector of input and β  a vector of technological
parameters. The technical inefficiency is defined by the ratio between the real
production with a fixed set of input and the best production with the same
quantity of input,
) , ( β X f
Y
TE =      which imply   1 0 ≤ ≤ TE
Deterministic methods take all observations as given and implicitly assume
that these observations are exactly measured. We opt for a stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA). Stochastic methods make explicit assumptions with respect to
the stochastic nature of the data by allowing for measurement error. This
approach is especially fruitful with panel data.
The panel model proposed by Battese and Coelli [1993, 1995] allows for
year/company specific efficiency measures to be estimated. The error
structure adopted below follows their specification.
yi
() β , X f y =
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Figure 2: Decomposing the error term of a one input stochastic
production frontier-8-
Consider the stochastic production frontier for panel data:
) exp( ). , ( it it it it u v X f Y − = β
where Yit denotes the production at the t-th date (t = 1, 2, …, T) for the i-th
firme (i = 1, 2, …, I);
Xit is a vector of values of known functions of inputs of production and
other explanatory variables associated with the i-th firm at the t-th date; β  is a
vector of unknown parameter to be estimated.
The vits are assumed to be iid N(0, σ v²) random errors, independently
distributed of the uits. The uits are non-negative random variables, associated
with technical inefficiency of production, which are assumed to be distributed
independently, such that uit is obtained by truncation at zero of the normal
distribution with mean zitδ  and variance σ u².
The technical inefficiency effects, uits, are assumed to be a function of a set of
explanatory variables zit, and δ  a vector of unknown coefficient. The technical
inefficiency effect in the stochastic frontier model could be specified as,
uit = zitδ  + wit
where the random variable wit is defined by the truncation of the normal
distribution with zero mean and variance σ u² (the point of truncation is -zitδ ). wit
and vit are assumed to be independent.
The technical efficiency of production for the i-th firm at the t-th date is defined
by
) exp(   ) exp( it it it it w z u TE − − = − = δ
The errors terms are assumed to be independent from each other and
form the inputs, Battese and Coelli propose the method of maximum
likelihood
3 for simultaneous estimation for the parameters β  and δ . The
likelihood function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters,
2 2 2
v u σ σ σ + =  and   ( )
2 2 2
v u u σ σ σ γ + = .
We consider this simultaneous estimation preferable compared to the two-
stage method. This older method consists of estimating a production frontier
first, deriving the inefficiency measures for each firm. At the second stage, the
inefficiency effects are regressed on some other variables, which explain
efficiency variations across firms by an OLS or a Tobit model. The two-stage
method is somewhat inconsistent since the inefficiency error terms are
assumed to be identically distributed for each firm in the first stage. This
assumption is contradicted clearly in the second stage when these error terms
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Y is the total quantity of vehicle-km.
X
P is the total number of personnel
X
E denotes the quantity of energy
X
V corresponds to the total number of buses
X
L is the network length
X
J is the total number of journeys
where the technical inefficiency effects are assumed to be defined by: 
it it it it it
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There are four variables in the vector z that influence efficiency. Firstly, the
regulatory scheme in a particular year is represented by three dummy
variables (NetCost,  GrossCost and Management). Secondly, three dummy
variables represent the three main companies of the sector (Keolis, Connex
and Transdev). Thirdly, a dummy variable notes if the network is in the year
before the results of the competitive tendering (tendering). Finally, a variable
stores the percentage of subcontracting.
Model 1 estimates the previous functions. Model 2 estimates the regulatory
scheme alone in order the test multicolinearity between the regulatory
schemes ant the operating company. Model 3 is a linearised version of the
logarithm of the Cobb-Douglas production function.
All models were estimated using the software FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli 1996).
According to table 5, the estimate for the variance parameter, γ , is close to 0.5
in the model 1 and close to 0.67 in the models 2 and 3. It indicates a
significant level of technical inefficiency.
The three major companies of the sector contribute to efficiency whatever the
regulatory scheme (except a Direct Administration, which excludes a
partnership). Transdev, which has a very small number of management
contracts, looks to be statistically in the best position.
The proximity of the next competitive tender procedure and the level of
subcontracting do not appear to have a significant influence on operators’
level of efficiency.-10-
Table 5: Production frontier estimation results
Variables Explicated variable: vehicle-km ; 989 observations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Constant 9.54 21.1 9.42 21.48 8.84 188.2
Personnel (ln P) 0.545 0.664 0.518 6.778 0.038 6.138
Energy (ln E) -0.764 -2.325 -0.583 -1.799 0.761 41.08
Vehicle (ln V) 0.051 0.209 -0.034 -0.140 0.170 11.07
Lines length (ln L) 0.148 1.238 0.137 1.198 0.021 3.245
Journey (ln J) 0.510 3.326 0.468 3.113 -0.061 -6.096
ln P x ln P 0.037 8.158 0.035 7.863
ln E x ln E 0.380 4.620 0.344 4.182
ln V x ln V -0.080 -1.599 -0.083 -1.642
ln L x ln L -0.021 -2.119 -0.019 -2.078
ln J x ln J 0.019 1.076 0.023 1.309
ln P x ln E -0.230 -6.024 -0.212 -5.533
ln P x ln V 0.092 3.150 0.080 2.847
ln P x ln L 0.022 1.330 0.020 1.302
ln P x ln J 0.034 1.716 0.031 1.621
ln E x ln V -0.156 -1.336 -0.110 -0.953
ln E x ln L 0.071 1.831 0.073 1.883
ln E x ln J -0.189 -3.106 -0.190 -3.069
ln V x ln L 0.014 0.404 0.006 0.170
ln V x ln J 0.123 2.142 0.116 2.014
ln L x ln J -0.073 -3.092 -0.070 -2.964
Constant -0.184 -2.871 -0.368 -5.667 -0.218 -1.224
NetCost 0.079 2.087 0.051 2.018 0.054 1.003
GrossCost -0.219 -3.627 -0.487 -5.489 -0.442 -1.570
Management 0.166 3.887 0.230 5.985 0.045 1.140
KEOLIS -0.075 -3.208 -0.242 -1.715
CONNEX -0.104 -3.187 -0.022 -1.088
TRANSDEV -0.204 -3.879 -0.241 -1.797
Tendering -0,0069 0.634
Subcontracting (%) 0,0004 3.202
2 2 2
v u σ σ σ + = 0.011 6.47 0.016 11.03 0.0186 3.332
()
2 2 2
v u u σ σ σ γ + = 0.496 4.41 0.670 17.12 0.6718 6.370
Log likelihood function 1114.37       1110.41     1042.41
LR test of the one-
sided error 42.11       34.18     26.18
The estimated coefficient (in the inefficiency model) of each contractual
arrangement creates particular interest within this study. The Management
coefficient is positive, which indicates that a regulation with a management
contract is more inefficient than a direct administration. The negative
estimates for GrossCost implies that networks with that type of contract, tend
to be less inefficient compared to direct management. In relation to net cost
contracts, the relationship is very weak because the coefficient is very small
and not very significant.
According to this estimation, the management contract, without incentives, is
the worth regulatory scheme in term of technical efficiency. This result was-11-
expected since the private company has automatically a subsidy which
exactly compensate its cost whatever its effort. Furthermore, contrary to a
direct administration, Organising Authorities are unable to observe the lacks in
its operator effort. The managers benefit from this informational asymmetry.
In a gross cost contract, the operator receives subsidies to finance the
expected operating deficit. As a consequence, the operator has a financial
interest in the productivity gains. Our estimation confirms that a gross cost
contract promotes efficiency. 
Theoretically, the net cost contracts have the same type of effect, but the
coefficient is close to zero. The net cost contract is the most common
contract. The nature of net contracts can vary and thereby could conceal the
overall effect. Typically, this type of contract is used by some OA to do away
with public transportation. The term  “net cost contract” is also used in some
contracts, including its clauses, which are relevant to a management contract.
For instance, over a certain level of losses, the OA will compensate the deficit.
Whatever, the coefficient is still significantly smaller than the management
one, which is relevant to the traditional theoretical proposition about
incentives.
Technical efficiency is correlated with incentives. Figure 3 represents the
three frontiers. The management contract frontier is under the others. The
possibilities of production with an incentive contract are higher. An incentive
contract reduces inefficiency. Moreover, the choice of a partnership between
the OA and one of the three major companies is statistically a source of
efficiency.
Figure 3: Frontier estimates for each type of contract (model 2)

































In this communication the Battese and Coelli model is used for this French
urban transport panel data. We measured simultaneously the technical
efficiency with a stochastic production frontier and the contractual effects on
efficiency. According to this approach, we observed the expected positive
effect of incentive contracts on technical efficiency.
This could be a strong argument in order to explain the decreasing number of
management contracts compared to the incentives ones.
As underlined by Johansen, Larsen and Norheim [2001], technical efficiency
is only part of the problem and tendering leaves the responsibility for market
efficiency to public authorities that very often have limited capability and
expertise. Once technical efficiency is maximised by incentive clauses, the
next stage for local public transportation is to internalise the benefits of an
increased level of service.
NOTES
1 They start to recover operator’s cost efficiency in order to model the effects
of the introduction of an optimal regulatory contract.
2 Marseille is not in our sample since it has light rail transits.
3 See Schmidt and Sickles [1984] for a survey on stochastic frontier estimation
methods with panel data.
4  For a detailed perspective of translog functional form see Christensen,
Jorgenson and Lau [1973]-13-
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